Quinnterland: The Greatest 20th Century Spy

The first and chief rule of espionage is trust no one. Everyone has their own agenda and if you give someone the benefit of the doubt then they will almost certainly make you regret that decision. Away from the field this rule visibly translates into what people say and write. Nothing can be taken for granted and you most certainly cannot believe anything you read. The greatest example highlighting this necessity for care does not come from Russia, but rather was provided by the now infamous James Jesus Angleton. Jim Angleton was a forerunner in the CIA, and it's anti-Soviet department, right up until the 1960s. However, ruthless as he may have been in his later years, Maclean and Philby were able to work in his patch with little risk of capture. As a result Angleton spent the rest of his life dedicated to the scrupulous identification and capture of Soviet spies on American soil. When speaking after the 1963 defection, Angleton is said to have made self-serving remarks about the day Philby received his CBE. Claiming to have spoken to Philby, he reported that the spy had explained “…what this country needs is good dose of socialism…”[1] This piece of conversation was used by Angleton to highlight that he had been aware of Philby’s true nature long before his defection. If he had been successful then it would serve to show that Angleton did indeed have a nose for a traitor and that he had not been made to look ridiculous by the Cambridge spies. Unfortunately for Angleton, Philby had not been at the ceremony. In actual fact records show, like many other recipients, Philby was sent his CBE in the post because of the large numbers given out after the war. This was unfortunate for Angleton and highlights the point that everything that is written or said in the world of espionage must be proven before it can be believed.

Foreign Service officer S. J. Hamrick is an individual who has clearly embraced the importance of reliable and indisputable evidence in the work of the modern historian. “Deceiving the Deceivers” was written with the intention of looking at the story of the Cambridge spies from a new and very different angle. He based his thesis on the 1996 release of the Venona intercepts, 1942-1945. Over the course of 34 years the Americans and British worked together to decode thousands of Soviet messages sent between Moscow, London, and Washington. Within these messages there lay clues to the identity of a Soviet spy working in the American Foreign Office. We now know this agent was Donald Maclean but as Philby highlighted, until late 1950 there was “…still no basis for supposition…”[2] on where the leak was coming from.

According to official records the CIA ciphers at Arlington Hall did not make the link between the code name Homer and Maclean until just before his May 1951 flight with Guy Burgess. The accepted version of the story claims “…Kim set his escape plan in motion…”[3] used inside information to get notice to Maclean, and gave him the opportunity to escape from London before his imminent capture and arrest. This version of events has been told in almost every book relating to Philby written in the last 45 years. However, in his recent publication, it is the self designated duty of Hamrick to convince the reader that Maclean, Burgess, and Philby were in fact pawns in a much bigger CIA/SIS ploy. He claims that, rather than holding the key to a swift and timely exit, Philby’s “…career was on its last legs…”[4] and that the real deception had been on the part of the CIA and SIS. Hamrick has set his book out in a very formal manner and its appearance mirrors the transcripts on which much of the content rests. This is very much in keeping with his mechanical attempt to use concrete facts and figures to demythologise and rewrite the greatest spy case in history.

Hamrick’s argument relies on the assumption that “…M15 had identified Donald Maclean as a Soviet agent long before May 25, 1951…”[5] In reaction to this discovery, rather than arrest him immediately, the British and American agencies chose to use it to their advantage and root out further Soviet spies in their midst. Thus rather than being the saviour of Donald Maclean, Philby was instead a vehicle for disinformation intended to “…provoke the Soviet embassy into action…”[6] Hamrick goes a long way to highlight evidence of the British use of deception and double cross tactics throughout their military history but finds it very hard to back up his claims with anything more than circumstantial evidence.

Throughout the book Hamrick appears to pay particular attention to the activities of Philby in his Washington career. It is his intention to show that he was the main source of disinformation and that he was not as effectual as a Soviet spy as either he or his legend would have you believe. Throughout his publication there are many assertions from the author of the weakness of Kim Philby. “KGB files released in the 1990s indicate that Philby’s espionage output during the war years didn’t compare to that of this fellow Cambridge spies…”[7] and “…they might have concluded that Philby had given Moscow very little from 1947 until 1963.”[8] These are just two examples of the harsh attitude Hamrick adopts towards Philby and his legacy. It is in the wording of these claims however that we can see the chink in this white knight’s armour. The use of the phrases ‘might have’ and ‘indicated’ are all too common in this interpretation of the Philby story. They prove the existence of theories throughout the book and highlight the lack of fact or proven actualities. Rather than providing an improved and revised version of this complex time in modern history, ‘Deceiving the Deceivers’ continues to add to the ‘what if’ section of the espionage library, giving little concrete evidence while trying to convince you he has.

This, however, need not be the case. For although the Philby story appears to be protected by a hall of mirrors, the coldest of Soviet shoulders, and a Britain reluctant to share the secrets of the infamous spy, it is possible to prove that Harold Adrian Russell Philby was indeed the greatest and most effective spy of the 20^th Century. Beyond the traps and tricks that surround the Philby story, proof of his effectiveness throughout his ten year career at the top of SIS is available to those who want and know where to find it.

Firstly, the NKVD deployed Philby with various goals, and his aims and instructions differed as much as his MI6 title did. Obviously his missions would not end with the last minute destruction of a WMD or the defeat of a notorious villain; after all he was not James Bond. Instead we must look at Kim Philby’s career in terms of his contribution to the defence of the Soviet Union. When speaking in his only lecture to the KGB he explained that during his 1934 recruitment “…it seemed obvious to me that, for any true Communist…defence of the Soviet Union was the first priority…”[9] During his illustrious career Kim was head of the Iberian section when Spain and Portugal were important battle grounds for German, British and Russian spies, he was head of the anti-Soviet department of SIS for several years, and he was British liaison officer with the CIA and FBI in Washington. As a result he was constantly privy to information that would always be of interest to the KGB and allowed them to stay one step ahead of their superpower rivals.

The ability of Philby to single-handedly protect the USSR was most evident when he was stationed in the United States of America. As liaison officer with the American intelligence services, his job was to represent Britain in the build up to any cross Atlantic operations. It would prove to be the peak of his service career; he had significant exposure to valuable information, and could exert a considerable amount of influence over decisions made by the CIA. It was thus not surprising that his two years in Washington led to a remarkable lack of success “…with the number of covert operation mounted in the late 1940s and early 1950s…”[10] Philby had passed every ounce of information back to his control officer through courier Guy Burgess. However, the USSR could only act on his messages once they had covered his tracks by duplicating it from other sources. These efforts were successful and the result was the eventual capture and, more often than not, execution of every Western force sent across the Iron Curtain. Astonishingly though, it would be 1967 before the “…betrayal is laid to Philby…”[11] and a further year before this would be confirmed in his autobiography. The actions Philby would have taken when dealing with possible infiltration are best highlighted in his treatment of “…one of the most extraordinary secrets of the cold war…”[12]

In what was known as the ‘Albanian Operation’, the allied intelligence services wanted to use rebel forces to provoke civil war in one of Russia’s satellite countries. They hoped that if the rebellion was successful then it would weaken the Soviet Union via a domino effect similar to the one that would appear later in South-East Asia. After much deliberation they chose Albania because it was the “…smallest and weakest of the socialist states…”[13] Marshal Tito had broken from the USSR in neighbouring Yugoslavia and reconstruction plans were struggling under the Communist government. With Kim Philby and James McCagar as joint commanders the allies set off to rearrange the face of Eastern Europe. When the Albanian émigrés left from their Maltese base they had no idea that they would be victims of one the most notorious betrayals of the Cold War. Newspapers claimed that of the 300 men sent in by SIS and the CIA 150 were either killed on landing or jailed and executed. The remaining 150 “…struggled back to Greece…”[14] The Albanian forces had been waiting for the arrival of the rebels and were dealt with swiftly. Obviously Philby could not be the only reason for this debacle; after all he was back in London and in exile of his own for the last two years of planning. He did however clearly “…betray the existence of an Albanian operation to the Russians.”[15] This was enough for the Albanians to infiltrate the rebels and lead them to their slaughter. Throughout Philby’s time in America there were similar attempts in satellites such as Latvia and Estonia, Poland, Armenia, and the Ukraine. As expected each of these covert operations resulted in similar levels of failure, much to the bemusement of the CIA and MI6.

Throughout the Cold War one of the biggest and most constant threats to the superpowers was the defection of agents to the other side. Paranoia and anxiety were prevalent in both Russia and the United States just from considering the possibility of a defection. They had every right to be worried. There were innumerable defections throughout the span of the Cold War and with each one there went the possibility of vital information being transferred to the enemy. For Kim Philby his experiences and run-ins with aspirant defectors presented the need for him to defend not only Soviet Union but his true identity as well.

In September 1945 First Secretary of the Soviet embassy in Istanbul, Konstantin Volkov, approached the British embassy to propose a defection deal. As it turned out Mr Volkov was employed by the NKVD and had been preparing for his defection for quite some time. In return for safe passage to Cyprus with his wife and £27,500 he offered a doorway to Russia’s secret service at home and abroad. In return for his requests Volkov promised “…data on three Soviet agents…one in the administration of the British counter-intelligence…”[16] and “…addresses of NKVD buildings in Moscow, the burglar alarm systems, key impressions, guard schedules, and a list of all agents in the Middle East…”[17] For Philby and Russia this was a dangerous proposition. The success of Volkov to defect would have meant the outing of three of the Soviet Union’s most important spies and the possible ransacking and bugging of their headquarters in Moscow. For MI6 it was a fantastic proposition, they had the opportunity to embrace the upper hand over the NKVD and potentially keep it forever. Naturally “C” immediately “…decided to give this delicate matter to one of its most talented administrators…”[18] As fate would have it that talented agent was Kim Philby. This was the first of several strokes of luck that would shape the course of the ‘Volkov Affair’ and give Kim hope that it could be resolved in his favour. His luck proved to hold but a satisfactory resolution could not have been found without substantial skill on the part of our Masterspy.

Upon his approach the embassy in Istanbul told Volkov that he would have to ask London for assistance. He knew that some British ciphers had been broken and so insisted that his request be posted in a secure diplomatic bag. When the bag arrived on Philby’s desk a week had passed. Thinking on his feet, Kim proposed that MI6 take the offer seriously and that he should go straight to Turkey and deal with it. This would allow him to remain in control for the entirety of the proceedings and dispel any suggestions that he may be culpable for the failure of the transaction. Unfortunately for Kim, Sir Stewart Menzies had another agent in mind for the cross continent journey. However, suffering from a fear of flying, Brigadier Douglas Roberts explained that he would have to reject the offer as he only travelled long distances by boat. Lady luck had shone on the double agent once more. Philby now had a window to contact his control officer and get the news to the NKVD. By the time he began his flight to Istanbul via Cairo three more days had already passed. By the time he arrived in Istanbul, via an unexpected stop in Tunis and having stalled and perverted the cause of justice as much as possible, three weeks had passed. Accounts vary on why he was chosen for the assignment and the details of his behaviour preceding his arrival in Turkey, but this is inconsequential. No matter how events are dressed up the essential facts remain the same. Volkov had disappeared by the time Philby tried to contact him in Istanbul and some time later “…at Lubyanka Volkov confessed and was shot…”[19] What is important is that one KGB file indicates Philby “…quickly informed his Soviet control officer in London…”[20] Without Philby’s quick thinking and well developed plan he would surely have been revealed and the security of the NKVD would have been under immediate threat.

The ‘Volkov Affair’ is only one of the many highlighted cases of defectors who threatened his position in MI6. Years earlier Walter Krivitsky and Igor Gouzenko had posed individual but equally as serious threats to his career and the Russian secret service. Nonetheless, the events of August and September 1945 highlight the ability of Philby to grab victory from the jaws of defeat. His impeccable skill and talent for the role of double agent served him well for the entirety of his career. Even when he was exiled to Beirut MI6 remained cautious of him and his motives for not immediately fleeing to Russia. That being said, even though he housed the ability to deal with threats using impeccable foresight and skill, this didn’t prevent him being unable to“…ever feel safe again until 1963 when he was home in Moscow…”[21] How ironic that it would be his friendship and incriminating link to the paranoid and bungling Guy Burgess that would seal his premature decline in MI6.

Throughout his career he was able to see off any challenges to his position and extract the maximum amount of information from his British employers to give to his Russian masters. When he first went to America he apparently wanted to impress Bedell Smith by memorising a 20 plus page document for his scrutiny and comment. Bedell Smith read it once and then had an extensive discussion with Philby referring to individual numbered paragraphs. What Philby didn’t tell anyone was that the document “…was a detailed account of how SIS and CIA would cooperate in the event of war with the Soviet Union…”[22] Moments like these contribute to the clear evidence that shows Harold Adrian Russell Philby to be the greatest spy ever to grace the twentieth century. As has been shown, his skill and finesse were to the advantage of the NKVD and KGB from the very beginning of his career in the early 1930s. The value of his information from three highly important positions in MI6 cannot be brought into question and it is only a matter of time before the documents held by the Official Secrets Act quell any alternative suggestions.

[1] John Ranelagh, The Agency, 1986, P.127